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ABSTRACT. Maritime security has been a long-neglected issue on the African security
agenda. This situation is changing incrementally, not the least because of the atten-
tion to the problem of piracy in the continent’s waters. The “piracy momentum” has led
to a significant intensification of maritime security cooperation. This article analyzes
current processes, strategies, and institutional responses to maritime security chal-
lenges. Drawing on a practice-theoretical constructivist reading of regime convergence,
this article investigates how continental actors interact, develop a common repertoire,
and engage in joint enterprises to address maritime security challenges. It argues that
several nascent transnational collectives are developing that can be interpreted as
providing the nucleus of maritime security communities.
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298 Christian Bueger
THE SALIENCE OF MARITIME SECURITY IN AFRICA
Maritime security has been a long-neglected stepchild of African security
politics.1 International donors as well as African states have paid only scant
attention to maritime threats and how maritime borders and regional waters
can be protected and policed. The construction of the African security archi-
tecture mainly focuses on land-based conflict and its resolution. It remains
preoccupied with more traditional security issues—interstate and civil war or
land-based concerns such as transnational terrorism.
Issues of maritime security are, however, vital for the continent in sev-
eral regards. Maritime security concerns the economic development of coastal
states: the benefits of a country’s exclusive economic zone, including fishing and
off-shore resource exploitation, can be realized only within effective maritime
security regimes. Insecure waters can have a considerable negative impact on
trade flows and transport costs. Maritime border disputes, if unresolved, carry
a high potential for military escalation up to the level of interstate war. Actors
threatening or challenging state governments, including transnational crimi-
nal organizations and illegal traffickers of humans, weapons, ammunitions or
goods, thrive on maritime instability.2 Weak maritime security may also fur-
ther smuggling and significantly undermine the tax monopoly of the state.
Maritime security is hence an important issue that relates to various questions
of stability and economic development.
There is, however, a new momentum of recognition for maritime security.
International and regional actors have started to tackle maritime security and
to develop strategies and new institutions. The initial spark for this develop-
ment has been the threat posed by piracy originating in Somalia as well as West
Africa. Piracy has drawn considerable attention to the maritime dimension of
security and demonstrated the potential of apparently very local (African) prob-
lems to rapidly gain transnational scale and impact world economy. Piracy has
proven to be an actual threat of significant proportions. Responding to piracy
has revealed how difficult it is to tackle maritime security threats and how
weak the continent’s infrastructure is to react to (or even prevent) their esca-
lation. While in 2012 and 2013 the rates of successful piracy attacks off the
coast of Somalia are down and the problem appears to be contained, piracy
continues to thrive in West African waters. The partial success of containing
Somali piracy, however, comes at the price of extensive international naval
deployments as well as significant investments of the maritime industry in
private security. International and regional actors have increasingly sought
institutional solutions that can contain piracy in the long run. Developing
these solutions intends not only to address piracy but the broader spectrum
of maritime security challenges. The piracy problem has created a window of
opportunity for considering the maritime in the African security architecture
and to improve the maritime security relations on the continent.
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This article presents one of the first reviews of the recent attempts to
lift maritime security on the African security agenda, to formulate maritime
strategies for the continent, and to build institutions. I document how mar-
itime security is addressed by a slowly but gradually emerging regime complex.
Describing responses to maritime security by the concept of “regime complex”
is useful since the emerging maritime security structures have a significant
degree of complexity, form anything but a well-ordered coherent whole, and are
characterized by informality, process, multiplicity, overlap, contradictions, and
incoherencies.3 Interaction is, however, very recent; no established patterns
of interaction have been formed, and much of it is still in the early stages of
construction. Hence, African maritime security structures form an “emergent”
regime complex. Because of this emergent character, such a regime complex is
less likely to have systemic effects and condition actor’s behavior. In contrast
to more mature regime complexes, such as global climate governance, emerg-
ing ones are less characterized by competition between institutions4, but are
driven by concerns of setting up linkages in the first place. The core analytical
task then becomes one of following the actors in their attempts to construct
more stable patterns of interaction, develop common resources and projects,
and align their behavior. These construction efforts can then in turn be inter-
preted in terms of which prospects for intensification and convergence they
show. Given the emergent character of the new regime complex, the focus has to
be on construction efforts rather than evaluations about efficacy. At present it
is too early to tell or speculate which structures of cooperation and competition
the regime complex will develop and how effective it will become.
In the case of the African maritime security regime complex we are dealing
with a security issue area. In consequence, it makes sense to study it by draw-
ing on contemporary security theory. A natural and well-established candidate
to develop an ideal understanding for cooperation and convergence is the con-
cept of “security community.” To use the concept as a tool requires, however,
some reinterpretation of the traditionalist notion and rephrasing it in the light
of contemporary security theory. Hence, the core question addressed in this
article is whether the current activities of building an African maritime secu-
rity regime complex can be understood as moves to the formation of a “security
community.”
To address this question I develop an understanding of an ideal-type of
convergence as flourishing and well integrated security community. Thus, I
read moves in the direction of such a security community as my core indi-
cator for more convergence. Security community formation can be described
on three levels: (1) the intensity with which actors engage and communi-
cate with one another, (2) the degree to which actors securitize together and
develop a common repertoire, and (3) the degree to which they engage in
a common enterprise. I limit my focus to continent-wide interactions, such
as the formulation of an African maritime security strategy at the African
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300 Christian Bueger
Union (AU), as well as the southern and eastern African responses, including
in the framework of the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the Djibouti
Code of Conduct (DCoC) process. This article does not investigate maritime
security cooperation in Western Africa in more detail, nor does it study in-
depth the activities of international actors, such as the contributions of the
European Union (EU) or the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) or the broader
international counterpiracy architecture.5
The article is one of the first attempts to review current tendencies in mar-
itime security cooperation from a theoretically informed perspective.6 As such
it contributes to three discourses: (1) the emerging discourses on how prob-
lems of maritime security can be governed, (2) the discourse on the shape
and future of the African security architecture, and (3) the more general the-
oretical and methodological debates on how (African) security regimes can be
interpreted and especially how the security community framework can be used
productively.
The next section introduces the underlying understanding of convergence
by briefly discussing the concept of security communities as ideal type. Drawing
on securitization theory and the communities of practice framework, I sug-
gest investigating African maritime security practice on the level of shared
repertoires, joint enterprises, and mutual engagement. Then I study recent
efforts of maritime security cooperation on the African as well as subregional
level. I conclude in suggesting that we can observe strengthened maritime
security cooperation. Yet some doubt is appropriate whether the objectives
the continent has set itself will be achieved and whether maritime security
cooperation leads to more stable and sustainable community structures.
SECURITY COMMUNITIES: IDEAL TYPES, SECURITIZATION AND
COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE
The concept of security community describes a collective with a high level of
transaction and communication in which nonviolent dispute resolution is the
norm.7 The discussion on security communities and on regime complex con-
vergence share a number of similar concerns, such as the emergence of shared
interests and identities and the question of overlap of different communities.8
A security community can be understood as an ideal type of full convergence in
the security issue area as members of a community do not consider themselves
as threats anymore and have developed a common identity and engage in joint
projects.9
It is important to be aware what it implies to speak of a security community
as an ideal type. Ideal types are “epistemological tools or conceptual constructs
enabling understanding.”10 For Max Weber, they present abstractions “from
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historical reality meant to enable us to better understand and interpret actual
phenomena.”11 Although based on an historical extraction of realities, they are
formulated as abstraction. They are extreme forms of phenomena, and they
are unrealistic. Actual phenomena might resemble to a larger or lesser degree
an ideal type. It is exactly the difference between the real type and the ideal
type that gives this epistemological tool its power. “Thus, they are construc-
tions with no direct empirical reference but stipulate a distinctive (abstract,
idealized) set of characteristics that enable comparison and classification.”12
Hence asking whether a form of political cooperation, such as the African mar-
itime security regime complex, is a security community or not, misses the point.
Understanding the concept in such a way also clarifies that a security commu-
nity is not an actual irreversible end state of a political process. Community
violence might still occur and the threat of the use of force might still be part
of the interaction within the community.13 It is important not to conflate an
analytical concept with actual political practice.14
Rather than drawing up an understanding of security community as an
ideal type by relying on the traditional definition provided by Karl Deutsch,15 it
is useful to rely on contemporary reformulations. In contrast to the Deutschian
understanding, these move away from a focus on the nation state as the
primary referent of security, go beyond war and conflict and consider the
full breadth of contemporary security concerns, and, most important, center
on practice. Since a regime complex is primarily “produced and reproduced
through practices,”16 it is important to acquire a thorough understanding of
the concept of practice.
As Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have pointed out, a security community
can be understood as a collective in whom the members construct securitiza-
tions with one another.17 By securitization the authors refer to the process by
which issues are rendered as problematic because they present threats to the
survival of a referent object.18 A securitization process, moreover, goes along
with proposals of measures, or scripts of action that should be adopted to
protect the referent object from the threat. Securitization gives us an impor-
tant understanding of the specificity of security regime complexes without
reducing the issue area to problems of war and conflict, as is done in the tradi-
tional understanding of security communities. The main criterion for a security
community is, then, that the members have a shared understanding of what
constitutes a threat and what does not, what requires security action and what
does not. In principle this implies that they are not securitizing one another.
Emanuel Adler has argued for an understanding of security community as
a “community of practice” drawing on the work of practice theorists Etienne
Wenger. Such a reconceptualization gives us a convincing concept of “practice”
and how it matters in the formation of communities and regime systems.19 For
Wenger, “communities of practice” are characterized by a “shared repertoire,”
a “joint enterprise” and “mutual engagement.”20 A shared repertoire consists
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302 Christian Bueger
of all of the tools that the community uses in its practices. This can include
various artifacts, such as meeting documents, databases, or communication
technology, but it also includes symbolic tools, such as representations, con-
cepts or a common language code. The concept of repertoire provides a direct
link to securitization theory since shared threat assessments can be seen as
one element of this repertoire. A shared enterprise is a distinct project that the
community pursues. Such projects provide standards of evaluation as well as
normative direction for the community. This can be, for instance, projects of
institution building, developing the repertoire further, or bringing about cer-
tain states of affair. Joint enterprises suggest a second link to securitization
theory given that securitization entails proposals for measures or projects of
protection. Finally, the concept of mutual engagement points to the importance
of continuous interactions, communication, and deliberations among a commu-
nity’s members. This dimension restores some of the original characteristics
of the Deutschian understanding of communities, which were above all char-
acterized by intense communication.21 Practice is what gives coherence to the
community, what combines these three elements. The concept of practice is
important as it is the intermediary between individuals and structures; that
is, in the present case, the collective. An individual becomes a member in the
collective in participating in the collective’s practices while the collective in
turn is glued together and made in those practices.
Such a conceptualization, moreover, leaves scale open and hence allows for
grasping complexity. It does not suggest how large or small a community is, who
its members are, or how many members are required. This is important to gain
a fluid and contingent understanding of security communities and to relate the
concept to the concern of regime complex theory. There might be several com-
munities and they might be nested, overlap, or in conflict with one another.
An individual might participate in only one community or in several. Hence
one security community might be nested or overlap with another.22 This allows
for disaggregating the state as unitary actor and focusing on the transna-
tional dimension. The nation state is but one community of practices in which
actors participate. Individuals are the members of a collective, not states. This
enables us to investigate communities of military professionals or diplomats,
which are the conventional focus of security community research. But with the
same toolbox we can investigate, for instance, a Southern African community
of conservationists sharing the securitization of poachers and mutually engag-
ing in a joint enterprise such as Rhinoforce fighting the poaching of rhinos or
an East African community of humanitarians that shares the securitization
of hunger and mutually engages in humanitarian projects or the coordina-
tion of them. Phrased otherwise, security communities can be issue-specific,
and they may include other actors than those representing the state (or might
even explicitly exclude state officials). The focus of analysis is hence on the
smaller specific collectives that form security communities. In the light of my
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empirical focus these are “maritime security communities.” These may or may
not be nested within larger geographical or other issue-specific community
structures.
In summary, to investigate actual convergence the article draws on the
ideal type of a security community as defined previously. A security community
is characterized by a shared repertoire tha includes a shared securitization,
a joint enterprise to include shared projects of protection, and a high level of
mutual engagement. This framework hence induces the study of the practices
in which actors engage with one another, build shared repertoires, construct
securitizations, and develop joint enterprises. It allows us a sense of how actors
build a maritime security regime complex and whether and how it develops
toward a security community.
REVIEWING AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY COMPLEX
Maritime security was for a long time not a major issue of African secu-
rity, and significant efforts to construct a maritime security regime complex
started toward the mid-2000s. Yet a number of institutions already addressed it
before the 2000s. Thirty-seven African states are members of the International
Maritime Organization (IMO). The IMO Council, its main government body,
has continuously included African representatives. The continent has a mar-
itime transport charter since 1993 and in consequence the AU has a maritime
office. Yet, as le Roux observed in 2006,
the Common African Defence and Security Policy of the African Union . . .
fails to address any maritime issue or threat. Indeed, reading these documents
leaves the impression of an Africa without a coastline or maritime zone, let alone
broader maritime interests such as trade and maritime resources.23
Of Africa’s regional organizations, SADC introduced in 1995 a Standing
Maritime Committee (SMC) as a sub-body of the Interstate Defence and
Security Committee (ISDSC). An intensification of activities on maritime secu-
rity starts from the early 2000s. Concerns over maritime terrorism led to a
new level of naval engagement in the frame of the U.S.-led Combined Maritime
Forces patrolling the Eastern Indian Ocean. Activities also concerned new
forms of international regulation, such as the adoption of the International
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code as part of the 1974 International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).24 The ISPS code, which
came into force in 2004, induced considerable international pressure to improve
risk management at the more than 100 port facilities in Africa. The follow-
ing sections demonstrate that mutual activities intensified from 2005, new
institutions were built, and existing ones started to address maritime security.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
hr
ist
ian
 B
ue
ge
r] 
at 
05
:25
 07
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
3 
304 Christian Bueger
My analysis traces actual practices mainly by studying policy documents,
meeting protocols, speeches, and newspaper articles. It starts with an investi-
gation of the mutual engagement of actors concerned about maritime security.
Since the objective is to understand practice, it aims at identifying where actors
meet and how they use existing institutions and create new ones. Mutual
engagement not only takes place in existing institutions such as the AU but
also in a range of newly created forums. This exploration of mutual engagement
is the most extended since this introduces the main activities and forums. Then
the analysis considers the repertoires of the emerging maritime security regime
complex. Drawing on a broad understanding of repertoire, it scrutinizes the dif-
ferent shared tools at the disposal of the identified collectives. The repertoire
consists of documents, strategies, and technology on the one side and shared
securitizations on the other. Finally, the joint enterprises of the collectives with
an emphasis on future developments are discussed. The intention is to pro-
vide an overview of the emergent practices building a maritime security regime
complex. Hence, not all of the activities can be studied in clandestine details.
Mutual Engagement: New Forums of Maritime Security Practice
Mutual engagement is first observable in a number of more or less informal
meeting formats that were established from 2005 onward. In 2005 the first Sea
Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS) was held and attended by senior naval mil-
itary officials. SPAS has become one of the major forums for interaction, with
further meetings held in 2006, 2009, and 2011. Participation has continuously
become more extended. The inaugural meeting was attended by senior naval
military officials of 24 states, where later meetings included representatives
from all African states, major international organizations, civil authorities,
port facility, and transport industry representatives or academic experts.
Another format, the East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean Maritime
Security Conference (EASWIO), was, on the initiative of the U.S. naval com-
mand, inaugurated in 2006. EASWIO participants came from the African
Indian Ocean littoral states. The first conference was primarily attended by
military staff and focused on the development of national maritime strategies.
Yet the two follow-up conferences in 2007 and 2008 broadened the agenda and
focused on regional strategies and the work of civil maritime authorities. At the
2007 conference, first ideas for developing a pan-African maritime security
strategy in the frame of the AU were discussed. The 2007 conference also led
to the establishment of two working groups tasked to explore the possibilities
of regional strategies that met throughout 2008.
Conferences, symposiums, or seminars are major instruments of mutual
engagement. They provide forums for discussion and significant interaction
and communication opportunities. Although the number of participants is
limited, they strengthen transnational relations and are the backdrop for the
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development of joint enterprises. As one participant to the second EASWIO
phrased it: “This is a great opportunity for people from different countries to
bring different ideas to the table, discuss possible solutions and develop a plan
to work toward a common goal when it comes to maritime security.”25
For a U.S. Navy official, participation in EASWIO “demonstrates a will-
ingness to work together to counter those who wish to exploit for political,
ideological or criminal reasons the region’s maritime domain. The collaboration
lays a strong foundation, and it will need to be strong as this is a commitment
of years, not days.”26
The outcome of the EASWIO process was a training center focused on
maritime security, which leads us to a further important type of mutual
engagement: joint training. The Maritime Center of Excellence (MCE) became
operational in June 2009 and is training junior officials since. Training centers
are important instruments for mutual engagement. As one graduate from the
first training course said:
I got to know my comrade who polices Kenyan waters because I am with him
in the same training . . . . That’s great because here we can get contact. I know him
now personally, and he knows me personally. On the other side [of Lake Victoria]
which he is opposite me, we can talk in case of anything, any [accident], in case of
any emergency or anything that happens in the waters.27
The importance of such activities is further highlighted by a professor teaching
one of the courses: “I think that is the most important part [of the training], is
being able to have these nations and their representatives sit down and com-
municate with each other and understand what each of them brings to the table
amongst these various scenarios that were going through.”28
From the perspective of Wenger’s community of practice theory, train-
ing activities are a central mechanism for fostering mutual engagement.29
They widen the collective of practitioners and introduce new members to the
practices of a collective by familiarizing them with the repertoire.
Another initiative was launched by the IMO in 2005. IMO sponsored a
series of meetings to discuss the prospects of regional maritime security cooper-
ation in the Western Indian Ocean region, including African states and littorals
from the Arabian Peninsula. The first subregional seminar on piracy and
armed robbery against ships and maritime security was held in Sana’a, Yemen,
in April 2005, and followed up by meetings in Muscat, Oman, in January
2006 and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in April 2008. The 2008 seminar devel-
oped a draft regional memorandum of understanding, which became the basis
of a regional agreement, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) signed at the
follow-up conference in Djibouti in January 2009. While the initial attempt
was to formulate a broader maritime security alignment, the DCoC concen-
trates on counter-piracy efforts. The corner stone of the agreement are joint
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training activities as well as the improvement of communication through three
information sharing centers and a system of national focal points.30
In 2009 a further conference format on maritime security was introduced,
the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Launched and initially sponsored
by the Indian navy, the annual symposium brings together naval representa-
tives from the Indian Ocean littoral states. It is hence a cross-regional format.
Although broader in scope it presents a platform in which representatives from
African navies meet one another. The IONS initiative also includes a joint pub-
lication titled IONSphere and an essay competition. Hence IONS goes beyond
a conference format and is also an instrument for producing shared knowledge
about maritime security.
The number of conferences and seminars that reflect mutual engagement
is certainly even broader. A significant number of more ad hoc events took
place starting from 2006, including several seminars hosted by think tanks
such as the Institute for Security Studies or the South African Institute for
International Affairs as well as the South African maritime security conference
organized by Defenseweb.
A different form of mutual engagement developed through the introduc-
tion of the Search and Rescue (SAR) infrastructure and the Global Maritime
Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). Based on the global attempt to develop
an infrastructure of monitoring and information sharing on maritime traffic in
the frame of the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, it
was decided at a conference in 2000 to establish five Regional Maritime Rescue
Centers (MRCCs) in Mombasa, Cape Town, Lagos, Monrovia, and Morocco and
26 Maritime Rescue Subcenters (MRSCs). The centers rely on multilateral
treaties and are designed to cooperatively provide search and rescue coverage
by monitoring ship movements, information sharing, and coordinating rescue
attempts. The first MRCC became operational in 2006 (Mombasa) and the last
in 2011 (Marocco). As Wells commented on this process, “for the first time
in African history a real maritime security ‘neighborhood watch’ is becoming
operational in each of the regional sea areas.”31 Introducing the regional and
subregional centers was accompanied by an extended training program by the
IMO. The centers provide a platform of communication on maritime security
across the continent. That the role of the centers should not be seen as a minor
technical form of cooperation was forcefully emphasized by the IMO secretary
general during the opening of the Monrovia MRCC:
I have no doubt that this network of regional MRCCs and their associated
sub centres will vastly improve the capability of the region to effectively coordi-
nate operations for the search and rescue of people in distress at sea, while, at
the same time, strengthening the capacity of countries in this part of Africa to
ensure effective responses to all threats to maritime security, including threats
from criminal elements such as pirates and armed robbers.32
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As highlighted by Mitropolous, the GMDSS is more than a plain technical
infrastructure but is a major tool for cooperation. Indeed it is one tool in the
new shared repertoire of African maritime security alignments.
Maritime Security and Engagement in Existing Organizations
The activities described so far are forms of mutual engagement outside
of formal security institutions. They are attempts to build and institutional-
ize new platforms for mutual engagement in the form of regular conferences,
training centers, and information-sharing infrastructures. In the next step I
investigate mutual engagement in the committees and meetings of existing
organizations—IGAD, SADC, and AU. Both SADC and AU have formalized
cooperation in the form of a maritime security strategy document.
IGAD issued a first communiqué addressing maritime security concerns in
2005. Addressing the issue of Somali piracy, the IGAD Council of Ministers
decided to coordinate its strategies and action plans to face this challenge.
Maritime security issues (notably Somali piracy), smuggling, and illegal fish-
ing and waste dumping were recurrent themes in IGAD’s various meetings.
Maritime security was placed on the agenda of IGAD’s Capacity Building
Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT). ICPAT commissioned a study “The
Impact of Piracy on the IGAD Region,” which was published and discussed
in various meetings in May 2009. The report called for further regional coop-
eration to tackle piracy. Following up, during the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa–Indian Ocean Community Regional Workshop on Piracy
for the Eastern and Southern Africa in July 2010, IGAD was tasked to draft
a “Somalia Inland Action Plan to counter and prevent Piracy 2010–2015.”
A further study was commissioned to draft such a plan, which was final-
ized in December 2010. The plan focused on addressing the root causes in
Somalia as well as improving regional infrastructure yet did not see direct
implementation. When the IGAD Security Sector Program (SSP) replaced the
ICPAT in 2011, maritime security became one of four core pillars. The March
2013 action plan projects major investments in maritime security coordination
and infrastructure.
SADC addressed maritime security issues within its annual SMC meet-
ings. The SMC initially coordinated naval forces of the SADC member states.
Joint activities include regular naval exercises often in cooperation with other
littorals such as Kenya as well as an annual naval pentathlon and regatta.
Engagement intensified following a July 2011 Extraordinary Meeting of the
SADC Defence and Security Council and Senior Staff Council on a Regional
Anti-Piracy Strategy. The meeting was interpreted as a “historic occasion, as
never before has all the defence chiefs of SADC gathered in the same place.”33
The strategy was formally adopted at a heads of states summit in Angola in
August 2011. The strategy proposes the joint procurement of naval vessels and
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the creation of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) centers—a mechanism to
strengthen information sharing on maritime security incidents and maritime
traffic. The strategy also encourages the revision of legal frameworks to per-
secute pirates and to work toward the ratification of international maritime
treaties. A task force was formed, comprising navy commanders from Tanzania,
Mozambique, and South Africa to lead implementation. The strategy led to two
MDA centers on the basis of a Memoranda of Understanding signed by the
member states as well as the appointment of permanent liaison officers for
information sharing. The MDA centers attempt to integrate existing data in a
single place and make them available to participants. In addition information
is collected from local observers acting as “coastal watchers.”34
The AU secretariat started to develop ideas for jointly addressing maritime
security from 2007. Before dealing with maritime security specifically, the AU
worked toward a revision of its 1993 maritime transport charter. When the
new charter was adopted at a summit in 2009, it was complemented with a
resolution that addressed maritime security. The so-called Durban Resolution
announced the agreement to cooperate and embraced the ISPS code as well
as DCoC as the major mechanisms for furthering maritime security. Work
on a maritime security strategy started formally in April 2010 with a first
expert workshop held on the matter followed by a more extended conference
in October of the same year. In June 2011 a task force was announced that
was mandated to develop a draft for what became the 2050 African Integrated
Maritime (AIM) Strategy. The draft was discussed at further expert workshops
throughout 2011 and 2012 as well as at the Conference of African Ministers
Responsible for Maritime-Related Affairs and the High Level African Maritime
Cross-Sectoral Senior Officials meeting. Work on the AIM strategy was com-
pleted by end of 2012. The strategy projects a permanent review mechanism
in the frame of a triannual revision of the strategy and an annual review
of its implementation. Moreover, part of the strategy is the creation of a
2050 AIM Strategy High Level College of Champions (HLC2), which is tasked
to contribute to the implementation by sustained lobbying throughout Africa.
In summary, a significant intensification of mutual engagement between
various actors can be identified in which the regime complex is being build.
There is a significant territorial overlap. There are Pan-African, sub- , and
cross-regional forms of engagement. Interaction not only takes place in the
frame of existing institutional settings but also in a range newly created ones.
Different types of actors engage with one another. These include navy officials
that have been driving many of the processes, senior representatives from civil
authorities, such as ministries of transport, fisheries, or port authorities as well
as academic and think tank experts. While these actors form the nucleus of the
alignments, two further actors are significant: junior staff who are trained in
the newly established training centers and state representatives and politi-
cians who have been authorizing the new strategies in official declarations
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and memoranda. What are the common resources developed throughout this
engagement process? In the next section I investigate what kind of shared
repertoire is part of the emerging African maritime security regime complex.
Shared Repertoires and Securitization
As Wenger argues, shared repertoires include “routines, words, tools, ways
of doing things, stories, gestures, symbols, genres, actions or concepts.”35
Repertoires develop through mutual engagement and become a core part of the
practices of a collective. The discussion of mutual engagement has revealed a
number of elements that are part of the shared repertoire of Africa’s maritime
security complex. Indeed a thicket of several elements can be identified. These
include, first, technological infrastructures. The RCMCCs, DCoC, and SADC
entail the establishment of information sharing centers. Such centers collect
data about the maritime domain and make them available to participants.
They produce a joint repertoire of basic information about what is happen-
ing in the maritime domain. Second, training centers, including the MCE and
the DCoC centers, are not only a tool for interaction but also develop a com-
mon stock of knowledge. This knowledge is what participants learn and can be
said to share afterward. Third, the newly established meeting formats ranging
from SPAS and IONS to the AU minister meetings and the HLC2 are part of
the repertoire in so far as they provide routines for engagement through regu-
lar meetings. Fourth, the regime complex is developed against the backdrop of
the international law of the sea (UNCLOS) as well as conventions (e.g., SOLAS)
and codes (e.g., ISPS). Although not all African states have ratified these legal
provisions, they form the foundation for building the regime complex. Indeed,
the majority of documents produced so far refers to these legal standards as
the basic framework for interaction and emphasize to work toward ratification
and compliance. Fifth, the documents produced in the activities are a major
part of the shared repertoire. Such documents include meeting protocols, con-
ference presentations and papers, declarations and statements, and officially
adopted strategies. Such documents are often conceived to be merely rhetoric.
Yet they are more than this. As policy researchers and anthropologists have
shown, documents are one of the main materials of policymaking. Documents
create a policy trajectory. As Riles argues, “Conferences and documents form a
kind of chain. The history of documents is created through the unfolding of one
conference from the materials produced at another, the incorporation of one
document into the next.”36
Indeed the documents are nested in one another in at least two ways. One
document refers to the earlier document. For instance, meeting protocols of
the SMC refer to and discuss the protocol of the earlier year. But there is also
cross-referencing of documents. The AIM strategy refers to SPAS, or IONS dec-
larations are referenced in SMC documents. It is, hence, through the use of
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documents that regimes become linked and nested in one another. One fur-
ther feature of documents is that they can be circulated to even far distance.
Through their materiality they can travel and allow for the coordination of
action. As Freeman and Maybin state:
The physical properties of policy documents extend the scope and reach of
governments in space and time. Their material inscription means that a stan-
dard message can be communicated to numerous public servants in numerous
and often distant locations, coordinating their actions. And the same message can
serve as a reference point for successive actors and actions over time.”37
It is in this sense that documents are part of the repertoire. They link differ-
ent actors and institutions, allow for the coordination of action, and provide
resources for further activities.
In-depth ethnographies will be required to reveal and understand further
elements of a shared repertoire.38 In how far can we also observe shared
representations? A core feature of security communities is that they share
threat assessments and that these are part of the repertoire. Meeting doc-
uments and transcripts of speeches provide major clues for shared threat
assessments. Analyzing these documents, it becomes first observable that the
majority of them point to a common set of maritime security threats: ille-
gal resource exploitation, transnational organized crime, piracy, environmental
pollution, and terrorist activities. Second, the threat of piracy is identified as a
major motivation to address maritime security. For instance, DCoC primarily
addresses piracy, and IGAD initially tackled piracy and only later broadened
its agenda to include other maritime security concerns. SADC’s response was
triggered by a piracy incident that occurred in the waters of Mozambique and
led to concerns that Somali piracy is coming closer to the subregion’s maritime
zones.39 Also, the AU’s development of the AIM strategy was, as documented in
the Durban resolution, motivated by concerns over piracy. The piracy problem
was important in the sense that it revealed that significant maritime threats
exist and that only multilateral responses can address them.
Let me briefly discuss two paradigmatic statements that document how
actors have framed maritime security. Other statements and documents reveal
similar patterns. Maritime security is framed as a regional challenge, and
the “region” or the “continent” is identified as the main reference object of
securitization. There is a strong dimension of “othering” in the sense that the
threats are conceived to be external and come from the outside. Moreover, mar-
itime security is considered important because of its economic dimension rather
than framed in terms of national security. The following statement was given
by a SPAS participant:
The challenge to us is to develop our maritime power, our naval power,
to a level where this continent will no longer be an easy target. That does
not mean building massive navies. It does mean developing the maritime and
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naval strength to control our waters, to protect our maritime assets and inter-
ests, and to discourage adventures by foreign actors, be they states or non-state
groups such as international terrorists, narcotics smugglers, illegal immigration
or mercenaries.40
In this statement the reference object that requires protection is the continent
which is so far an “easy target.” The statement is also very explicit that the
main perpetrators that maritime security shall be concerned about are foreign
actors, which can be states or non-states. There is, moreover, a strong economic
understanding of the challenges of maritime security. Such a pattern is visible
in the following statement:
Maritime security is a regional concern to all SADC Member States. Both
SADC coastal states and SADC land-locked states are equally dependant on mar-
itime trade. In many instances, SADC Maritime security is not only linked to
trade, but also to other important aspects of their economy such as commercial
fishing and tourism. SADC countries, even land-locked countries, are dependent
on maritime trade for economic prosperity.41
The quote first documents another case in which the region is the main geo-
graphical referent object of maritime security and, second, the speaker makes
a strong case for the link to economic prosperity and stresses trade, fishing,
and tourism as important elements. While these are only two paradigmatic
examples they reveal common constructions of securitizations.
In summary, a substantial amount of elements make up an emergent
shared repertoire. This includes technology, training centers, international law,
documents, and shared securitizations. What are the main underlying joint
enterprises?
Joint Enterprises
Throughout the mutual engagement a rich set of projects have been
identified by actors and pursued. This included not only the drafting of
shared strategy documents and the ratification of treaties and memoranda of
understanding. The joint projects that the maritime security regimes develop
have been well described by Leijenaar. Following her, the projects consist of
developing
effective maritime legislation, the establishment of a combined exclusive
maritime zone, good governance, education and training, ports and harbour
management, maritime scientific research, inclusion of the private sector in
developments, risk management, maritime defence and security, tourism, estab-
lishment of regional maritime early warning centres, common fisheries policies
and a naval component.42
This is arguably a very wide set of tasks. Seen from a contemporary per-
spective, some of these enterprises are advanced already. One shared project
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is, hence, the maintenance of the structures that have been developed in
the past decade. This includes keeping information-sharing centers staffed
and operational as well as ensuring that training activities are ongoing. It is
also to further intensify the communication among maritime security officials,
experts, and ministers dealing with maritime matters as well as to ensure that
the information sharing systems and training activities run smoothly.
The other areas will require ongoing work. Information is not enough, since
naval capabilities are also required to police waters or make arrests. Building
and maintaining naval capabilities is a core challenge. Procurement can, how-
ever, be a costly and politically difficult exercise. Electorates might reject the
significant investments required, and corruption can drive up costs. Since
navies require advanced training to become operational, this is also a long-
term project. Training officers can easily take decades. Strengthening maritime
security will require significant technical competence as well as a considerable
level of interagency and civil-military coordination, which is already difficult
to achieve on the national level. Moreover, the different treaties, codes, and
memoranda of understanding that will have to be ratified induce a lengthy
legislative process.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN MARITIME SECURITY
Maritime security has become a major challenge for the African continent.
From 2005 onward, and significantly intensifying with the growing concerns
over Somali piracy, a diverse set of institutions is under construction to address
maritime security. In consequence, a maritime security regime complex is
emerging. This article has described the work of constructing this regime com-
plex along three domains. An investigation of mutual engagement revealed
a rich set of new types of activities and forums. New meeting formats imply
increased communication—information-sharing platforms develop a common
stock of knowledge and information and training centers educate a new gener-
ation of maritime security officials. A shared repertoire is being developed in
these activities. Elements in this repertoire include technical infrastructures,
training centers, legal codes, documents, and shared securitizations and threat
assessments. Moreover, various joint enterprises can be identified, stretching
from the maintenance of the built infrastructure to the developing of navies,
education, ratification processes and coordination challenges.
These observations allow for the conclusion that various overlapping and
nested collectives are being formed that constitute proto-forms of maritime
security communities. These are issue-specific collectives. Their nucleuses are
actors other than politicians, statespeople, and diplomats. They are driven by
actors such as naval staff and maritime experts. We can observe an intensifying
level of interaction and communication, the construction of shared repertoires,
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and evolving joint enterprises of these maritime actors. Yet these actors are
specialized transnational professional communities. It would be, hence, a mis-
take to suggest that these communities allow for conclusions in regard to
general African interstate security community formation. The value of the
revised understanding of security communities introduced in this contribution
is to make visible these smaller formations of transnational collectives that
work toward the formation of issue-specific security communities via shared
securitizations and forming communities of practice.
In observing the efforts of constructing a maritime security regime com-
plex, we can see patterns of interaction emerging that indicate a growing
convergence. The maritime security regime complex is, however, an emergent
one. While a trend toward convergence is apparent, at present claims about the
future shape of the regime complex and the efficacy it will have to respond to
maritime security challenges are speculative. Further insights will be required
on which practices are shared by actors in the frame of which collectives and
how temporarily precarious they are. This will require more detailed, centrally
ethnographic, studies. Further investigations will have to study how the vast
challenges of furthering maritime security cooperation are tackled; how agree-
ments, strategies, and memoranda are translated into action; and whether the
maritime security regimes and communities grow in members and resources.
This will also entail asking whether the African maritime security regime com-
plex, once it matures, corresponds with the expectations of regime complex
theorists and conditions the behavior of African actors through the logic of
competition and forum shopping mechanisms.
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